H
ow is rebellion sustained? This question is more complex than it appears. Scholarship on individual and group mobilization has demonstrated how relative deprivation (Gurr 1971) , group identification (Gould 1995; Horowitz 2000 Horowitz , 2001 Wickham-Crowley 1992) , moral and emotional motivations (Petersen 2001 (Petersen , 2002 Wood 2003) , and friendship (McAdam 1986; Verkaaik 2004 ) may influence actors' decisions to participate in collective violence and other high-risk behaviors. Research on organized rebellion, for its part, has focused on determinants of explicitly violent behavior (Humphreys and Weinstein 2006; Kalyvas 1999 Kalyvas , 2006 Lawrence 2010; Pearlman 2011; Weinstein 2007) or on patterns of participation in or support for rebellion (Gould 1995 (Gould , 1996 Humphreys and Weinstein 2008; Petersen 2001; Viterna 2006; Wood 2003 ). Yet sustaining a militant organization 1 requires not only foot soldiers but also the development and upkeep of politically, financially, and logistically focused subdivisions. Without a logistical and support apparatus, organized armed rebellion reduces to violent protest.
Not all rebels fight on the frontlines, but current theories ignore differences in how foot soldiers, public relations flaks, and smugglers join and participate in militant organizations. These actors inhabit different roles and are embedded within distinct suborganizational divisions. Moreover, the accountants who manage a group's funding sources, the intelligence operatives who report enemy activities, and the diplomats who handle alliances may play an equal or even larger role than individual fighters in assuring a militant organization's ability to sustain operations, manage crises, and survive in the long run. This reality raises a series of crucial and under-researched questions: How do militant organizations cope with acute repression, displacement, or fragmentation? How do they deploy family, friendship, and community ties and leverage factors such as gender during crises? In other words, what explains rebel groups' resilience? To answer these questions, scholars must situate militants in their organizational and social context.
Using the case of Palestinian militant organizations in wartime Lebanon (between 1982 and 1988) , this article argues that patterns of overlap between formal militant hierarchies and quotidian social networksthat is, everyday kinship, marriage, friendship, and community-based relationships (Petersen 2001, 16-17) -determine the availability and nature of militants' mobilization pathways. I contend that a resilient information, finance, and supply apparatus built on rebels' quotidian ties was central to Palestinian militant organizations' reemergence in Lebanon. Due to the prewar compartmentalization of social, military, and political offices within the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and guerrilla organizations, a predominantly female network of co-members mobilized after most male cadres were deported, imprisoned, confined to their homes, or forced deep underground. Individuals' personal networks frequently spanned geographic, substantive, and political subdivisions across the PLO, different guerrilla organizations, and the LebanesePalestinian national divide. For example, a 16-year-old boy in the military scouts may have had a mother in the General Union of Palestinian Women (GUPW). A Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) official may have had brothers in two other guerrilla organizations and a husband in the PFLP with her. Strong, trust-based quotidian relationships formed partially redundant social networks that linked militant organizations' subdivisions after formal chains of command were severed. Over time, these networks bypassed established organizational hierarchies, linking an increasing number of organizational subdivisions.
By tracing the emergence and development of these clandestine logistics networks, this article demonstrates how quotidian relationships served as informal bridges between the Palestinian militant organizations' predominantly male fighting units and more gendermixed or female-dominated support, logistics, and social divisions within formal organizational apparatuses. Quotidian social structures channeled women and Lebanese sympathizers (both male and female) into brokerage roles as couriers, intelligence agents, and smugglers. Previous participation in militant groups' social organizations and the overlap of kinship and friendship ties with formal organizational hierarchies made these categories of participants "structurally available" and gave them prior activist histories, two key determinants of high-risk action (McAdam 1986, 65, 69-71) . Put broadly, these intersections between militant and quotidian networks became sites of organizational innovation (Burt 2005 , Padgett and McLean 2006 , Padgett and Powell 2012 .
SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS ANALYSIS
Analyzing the supply lines rather than the frontlines reorients discussions of rebellion away from initial mobilization and toward the processes and relationships that sustain it over time (Petersen 2001) . Concentrating on understudied "back-end" processes of armed rebellion clarifies the role that they play in everyday militant decision making and long-term survival, in particular because these processes strongly influence strategic choices and affect military effectiveness (Van Creveld 1977) . Problematizing the diverse roles that "behind the scenes" actors play within rebel organizations challenges current scholarly understandings of participation in political violence by underscoring the simple fact that sustained, violent rebellion requires some militants to keep their hands (or records) clean. This seemingly paradoxical point provides an opportunity for scholars to move beyond the standing assumption that everyone participates for the same reasons; instead, maintaining a rebel organization requires many different types of militants, who not only mobilize along different trajectories (Viterna 2006) and accept varying levels of risk (Petersen 2001) but also serve in diverse roles. Rather than relying on imprecise terminology such as "participation" or "fighting" to describe all rebel mobilization trajectories, analyzing logistics and support networks highlights the different ways in which people apply their skills, backgrounds, and connections to their understandings of what it means to "resist," "struggle," or "rebel."
Moreover, co-analyzing militant and quotidian social network structures in the context of rebel logistics provides direct insight into the social processes of civil war; that is, "the transformation of social actors, structures, norms, and practices at the local level-that sometimes leave profound social changes in their wake" (Wood 2008, 540) . Although many scholars have identified social network structure as being a fundamental component of high-risk mobilization and organized violence (Barkey and Van Rossem 1997; Centola and Macy 2007; Gould 1993 Gould , 1995 Gould , 1996 Marwell, Oliver, and Prahl 1988; McAdam 1986; Petersen 2001; Siegel 2009; Wickham-Crowley 1992) , few researchers, as Jeff Goodwin (1997, 53) notes, have paid attention to the influence that rebels' quotidian kinship, romantic, and friendship ties have within militant organizations.
2 This perspective is even more important because militant organizations are often active, strategic agents in wartime social change; they may, for example, regulate dating and marriage, restructure health care, or remake land tenure agreements (Mampilly 2011; Peteet 1991; Pool 2001; Wood 2003) .
Studying clandestine supply networks also highlights the frequently gendered nature of high-risk mobilization and collective violence and opens new avenues for inquiry into this phenomenon. Women have been centrally involved in logistics and support work in, for example, Irish (Alison 2004a; 2004b; Ryan 1999) , Algerian (Amrane-Minne 1992 , Salvadoran (Viterna 2006; Wood 2003) , Eritrean (Bernal 2001; Pool 2001, chap. 3; Wilson 1991) , Zimbabwean (Lyons 2004 ), Sri Lankan (Alison 2003 , and Sierra Leonean (Coulter 2009, 135-36) rebel organizations, as well as serving as ground troops. Evidence indicates that the same pattern may hold for recent uprisings in Libya and Syria ("Heroes of the Tripoli Underground" 2011; Holmes 2012; "The Country Formerly Known as Syria" 2013). Female militants are disproportionately represented in logistics and support work relative to their overall participation in militant organizations; for example, only 3.1% of the roughly 10,949 Algerian women who fought the French served as ground troops (2,000 women joined the maquis, or rural guerrilla rebellion, with many serving as nurses), whereas approximately two-thirds of women in the Algerian civil resistance "were either in charge of refuges or supplies" (Amrane-Minne 1999, 62-65) . In 1979, 30% of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front's (EPLF) members were female, but women represented 35% of the administrative staff, 55% of the health care staff, and only 13% of ground troops (this number officially rose to 23% by 1989) (Pool 2001, 95-96) . Louise Ryan argues that Irish women's "invisibility"-due to their participation specifically in covert operations and clandestine logistical work during the 1916 uprising-"may have contributed to their omission from accounts of the war" (Ryan 1999, 264) ; her observation suggests that women are most likely to participate in the kind of revolutionary work that is generally hard to observe from outside and less likely to be recorded due to its secretive nature. This tendency contributes both to a systematic underestimation of logistic sub-units' importance and a biased representation of female rebels.
RESEARCH DESIGN
Studying the emergence of Palestinian clandestine supply networks in 1980s Lebanon provides a unique opportunity to evaluate the complex mechanisms through which rebels create, join, and participate in logistics units. Analyzing this single, multifaceted case allows me to exploit three factors: the preexisting overlap between Palestinian militant groups and quotidian kinship, marriage, and friendship ties (Peteet 1991; R. Sayigh 1979 R. Sayigh , 1998 ; the similar institutionalization of Palestinian communities across Lebanon before 1982 (Rubenberg 1983; Team International Engineering and Management Consultants 1981) ; and variation in the wartime social context across time (see Fig. 1 ). Specifically, because the Israeli occupation effectively partitioned Beirut from Saida and Sour between 1982 and 1985, and due to local distinctions in violent tactics between 1985-88, I am able to nest regional substudies within the broader case.
3 Leveraging sources of variation within a single case allows me both to parse how local contexts produced different network interactions across similar communities and to endogenize the effects of regionally specific wartime violence on organizational development (George and Bennett 2005) . Moreover, this approach controls for such factors as groups' ideologies, ethnic makeup, social bases, and training regimes. By examining a single case, I thus privilege the capture of micro-and meso-level dynamics in order to theoretically inform future research, rather than seeking to test hypotheses via a cross-national design (George and Bennett 2005, 19-22; Gerring 2004 ).
An ethno-historical approach to studying militant organizations has several advantages in comparison to other methodologies. In contrast to survey-based research, such as, for example, Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy Weinstein's (2006) study of militants in Sierra Leone, ethnographic methods allow researchers to progressively build trust with their informants-thereby gaining access to insider perspectives, experiences, and meaning-making practices rather than taking for 3 I selected these research sites because Palestinian communities and militant organizations were heavily and similarly concentrated in and around Beirut, Saida, and Sour before the 1982 invasion (Central Bureau of Statistics 1981; Sa'id Ibrahim 1983; TIEMC 1981) . Palestinian communities in these cities were directly affected by the 1982 withdrawal of the PLO and guerrilla organizations (PLO and guerrilla personnel did not evacuate eastern or northern Lebanon), the Israeli occupation, Lebanese government campaigns, and the War of the Camps.
granted external categories of participation or behavior (Bayard de Volo and Schatz 2004; Gerring 2001; Pachirat 2009, 143-144; Wedeen 2009 Wedeen , 2010 . Trust and analytic insight are crucial to accessing and situating restricted information that is unlikely to be gathered in a one-shot interaction and that is not captured in documents or other accessible historical material. Second, the "present-day" relationships and knowledge that ethnographers develop allow them to probe interlocutors' past experiences for points of continuity and rupture. Immersion in an organization permits researchers to observe its members, spaces, and everyday practices and to probe the ways in which that organization and the roles within it change over time (Yanow 2012, 3) . Ethnographic approaches are thus particularly suited to capturing the structures, dynamics, and practices of organizational divisions that were never "put to paper." Third, ethnography gives researchers the context necessary to identify and analyze what Lee Ann Fujii terms "meta-data"-the "informants' spoken and unspoken thoughts and feelings which they do not always articulate in their stories or interview responses, but which emerge in other ways"-rather than taking interlocutors' responses at face value or as given "truth" (Fujii 2010, 231) . When dealing with potentially sensitive topics, it thus has a marked advantage over work based solely on formal interviews. Fourth, an ethnographic perspective, particularly when informed by social network theory, avoids making the individualist assumptions that have dominated recent political science scholarship (Wedeen 2009, 81; 2010, 260) . Rather than adopting the premise of maximizing actors driven by known, ordered preferences and "divorced, for the sake of general propositions, from actual historical processes" (Wedeen 2010, 260) , these perspectives treat actors as inherently socially embedded (Granovetter 1985; Wedeen 2002 ) and allow researchers to problematize the relationship between individual agency, social context, and organizational structure.
This article is based on 19 months of fieldwork carried out in the cities of Beirut, Saida, and Sour between 2007 and 2012. 4 I conducted interviews with 106 current and former members of Palestinian militant organizations, social and humanitarian aid workers, and long-time United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East 4 Research for this article was conducted under IRB protocol H10075. I conducted interviews predominantly in Levantine Arabic without a translator present. For security and methodological reasons, interviews were never recorded; I was concerned that introducing a recording device into my interactions would make interviewees uncomfortable and, given the ongoing surveillance of Palestinian groups, introduce unacceptable risk into the project. It is common practice not to tape or digitally record politically oriented interviews in the Middle East. For example, scholars such as Amaney Jamal (2009 ), Jillian Schwedler (2007 , and Lisa Wedeen (1999 did not record their interviews. Because of the confidentiality procedures that were implemented to protect human subjects, interviewees are cited without attribution. Interviewees were given pseudonyms, and their identifying details have been altered.
FIGURE 1.
(UNRWA) employees.
5 Of these interviews, 24 were oral histories with current or former militants who had personal involvement with clandestine operations during the 1980s; however, many other interviewees discussed underground activities. Additionally, my participant observation among current and former members of militant organizations included thousands of informal conversations and interactions that I recorded in 5 Operational since 1950, UNRWA provides schooling and health care services, and it maintains some infrastructure in the camps. my field notes. To account for local and national-level processes, including regional variations in the belligerent parties and the violent tactics used between 1982 and 1988, I interviewed people who worked locally in Beirut, Saida, and Sour, in addition to those who worked across regions. This approach allowed me to separately examine the nascent communications and supply networks under Lebanese government rule in West Beirut from 1982-84 and the Israeli occupation of Saida and Sour from 1982-85, and then to evaluate these separate systems' consolidation into a national supply and communications apparatus during the War of the Camps (1985-88) .
The reconstruction of this network, which has been only peripherally mentioned in existing studies, illustrates the value of ethnographic methods in sensitive research. My repeated interactions with interlocutors yielded longitudinal, egocentric network data for key clandestine actors who operated in each camp, each region, and across regions. Interested in the range of positions available, the practices that accompanied them, and the reasons that people remembered for participating in them, I catalogued each interviewee's organizational and social roles over time and the activities of any close family and friends. Rather than treating rebellion as a dichotomous variable by listing people as "fighters" or "nonfighters," I sought to tease out the ways in which people vacillated between fighting and logistics jobs over time and how clandestine organizations evolved around and shaped their members' careers. Combined with relevant historical texts (such as official documents, battlefront video footage, and party publications), fighters' and aid workers' memoirs, surveys (published by political factions, aid organizations, and the United Nations), and Arabic newspaper reports, this data allowed me to evaluate interactions between formal organizational hierarchies and quotidian systems of affiliation. Secondary case and theoretical literature provided further perspective. Taken together with sustained ethnographic work, these data reveal a rich picture of mass mobilization, organizational evolution, and social change.
THEORIZING CLANDESTINE MOBILIZATION
Why and how do individuals join clandestine logistics networks? Participation in underground political activity under occupation or during civil war is not only profoundly risky but it also often lacks the public status rewards that are associated with high-risk collective action. Former participants in clandestine operations frequently noted that most of their family and friends were unaware of their activities. Some interviewees hid their activities for safety reasons-Palestinian activists' family members were frequently arrested or abused if they could not be found (R. Sayigh 1979, 151). 6 Others worried that their parents would try to stop them. In contrast, individuals who openly participated in military operations were publicly revered as heroes or martyrs. For example, many interlocutors remembered "Dalal's operation" in 1978; women in particular saw the female fighter as an inspiration. 7 This evidence suggests that more nuanced factors than status rewards and public pressure played a large role in mobilizing militants into logistical and support roles.
Roger Gould argues that formal organizations are critical to expanding the scale at which group identities are considered salient, but that "their impact on social interaction tends to go unnoticed" (Gould 1995, 21-22) . That is to say, membership in formal organizations feeds back into individuals' relationships, shaping their social worlds. In this world, A meets B outside of her daily social interactions (e.g., family, friends, neighbors) because of the ideological and organizational ties that place them in each other's spheres for the first time. B becomes part of A's regular circle; perhaps they get to know each other's families and friends, establishing an entirely new set of social network ties. Thus "an unintended consequence of formal organizations, in other words, is the creation of social ties that encourage the recognition of commonalities on a scale considerably broader than would be expected on the basis of social networks alone" (Gould 1995, 22) . However, Gould never notes how diverse affiliations within families or friend groups may change the ways in which relatives or friends engage politically within the context of external organizations, nor how these relationships may have larger consequences for the organizations in which they are members.
In a similar vein, Mark Granovetter argues that individuals bound by strong ties should be part of overlapping networks; that is, individuals who have long-term, intense, intimate, reciprocal relationships should have similar relationships with each others' friends (Granovetter 1973 (Granovetter , 1361 . Thus, if A and B meet through an organization and form a friendship, they should eventually start becoming friends with each other's friends as well. This claim is founded on the concept of structural balance: The central idea is that "friends" evaluate others in similar ways (i.e., they both "like" or "dislike" the same people). Thus, if two people, A and B, have positive feelings about each other, and person B has positive feelings about person C, then person A will also know and have positive feelings about person C (Wasserman and Faust 1994, 221) . However, because these networks tend to produce extensive overlap in relationships, weaker ties-thought of as "acquaintances"-are necessary to diffuse information across larger networks of individuals (Centola and Macy 2007; Granovetter 1973 Granovetter , 1365 Granovetter -1366 . Otherwise, all information would remain within overlapping cliques bound by strong ties, unable to jump between tight-knit groups. In line with this theory, Granovetter contends that, "except under unlikely conditions, no strong tie is a bridge" (emphasis in original) (Granovetter 1973 (Granovetter , 1364 .
I argue that clandestine supply networks emerge from formal militant hierarchies because strong, quotidian ties serve bridging functions. The configuration of the overlap between rebel organizational structures and militants' quotidian relationships-rather than the replication of ties across these networks alone-produces these brokering positions. For example, A and B, the two close female friends, may work in a particular organizational sub-unit, whereas C-A's husbandworks in another division. Certain organizational structures may thus allow for strong ties-in particular kinship, marriage, and community ties-to act as bridges between organizational subdivisions. Particularly in socially segregated societies, Granovetter's bridging rule may consequently be violated. For example, in a more gender-stratified society, B may not be acquainted with C because she does not socialize with married men; thus, A is a bridge between B and C. When this triad is present within a rebel organization, the bridge between A and C allows for the secure transmission of information, money, military orders, or even weapons across an organizational divide, reaching B and others who share unit membership with A. Strong ties in bridging positions allow for trust between otherwise isolated cliques of individuals, a critical building block of underground networks.
Quotidian relational bridges may become active as violent conflict progresses, rather than being preemptively designated for organizational tasks. In other words, when A and C are initially recruited, the tie between them may only represent a latent source of structural power, rather than a deliberate effort to provide a communication redundancy. As a militant organization seeks to adapt to new circumstances or to manage crises, bridges such as the one between A and C offer means through which to resolve information or supply problems by bypassing inflexible organizational hierarchies (Burt 2005) . The activation of A and C's quotidian relationship as an organizational asset introduces a new mode of participation for A and C, altering their organizational roles. In other words, these informal, latent social structures present alternate pathways of mobilization within rebel organizations. Yet the changing nature of their organizational relationship will also feed back into their "private" relationship, driving social change (Padgett and McLean 2006; Padgett and Powell 2012) .
ORGANIZATIONAL FRAGMENTATION AFTER THE 1982 INVASION
On June 6, 1982, the PLO's organizational apparatus, headquartered in Beirut since its 1971 expulsion from Jordan, experienced a massive shock when the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) invaded Lebanon. Prompted by the fringe group Fateh-Revolutionary Command's June 3, 1982, attack on the Israeli ambassador to the United Kingdom, the IDF bombed PLO offices in Beirut. In retaliation, the PLO launched missiles from South Lebanon toward civilian settlements in northern Israel, triggering a long-planned invasion by the IDF aimed at destroying the PLO (Y. Sayigh 1997, 505-21; Schiff and Ya'ari 1984, chaps. 1-6) . The Israeli government had initially anticipated clearing a limited border zone to prevent further PLO missile attacks and guerrilla infiltrations, but instead directed the IDF to continue north to Beirut as the Israeli Air Force bombarded it (Schiff and Ya'ari 1984, chaps. 7-11) . Throughout the summer, Beirut remained under siege as the PLO and leftist Lebanese militias battled the IDF in the southern suburbs. Following negotiations, the PLO's international bureaucracy and guerrilla fighters from multiple parties (14,398 personnel and soldiers total) evacuated Lebanon at the end of August (Y. Sayigh 1997, 537) . International peacekeeping troops-dubbed the multinational forces (MNF)-deployed in Beirut and its southern suburbs to monitor the ceasefire, evacuation, and IDF withdrawal.
In the fall of 1982, hundreds of thousands of Palestinian civilians and low-level party cadres who remained in Lebanon were still reeling from the invasion, which destroyed Palestinian refugee camps in South Lebanon, left many Beirut neighborhoods in ruin, and fragmented Palestinian resistance organizations. 8 The IDF occupied South Lebanon, including refugee camps in Saida and Sour; more than ten thousand Palestinian and Lebanese men and many women from this region between the ages of 15 and 60 were interned at facilities such as the Ansar prison camp outside Nabatiyya or, if they were deemed high status, were sent to detention facilities in Israel (Abourahme 2010; Denkner 1983; Giannou 1982; Khalidi 1985; Khalili 2008; Schiff and Ya'ari 1984, chap. 8; Yermiya 1984) . Men from South Lebanon who were not immediately arrested fled to the Shouf Mountains, to the Beqa'a Valley, or to Trablous. This series of events deprived most Palestinian families in South Lebanon of their male household members, leaving them both homeless and lacking income to rebuild.
Assassinations and denunciations defined the postevacuation environment in Saida, making political organizing risky. By October 1982, there were clear signs of targeted killings by Christian militias in 'Ayn alHilwa camp. 9 The IDF also created a militia dubbed the "Palestinian National Guard" that policed the camps in South Lebanon and denounced political activists to the Israelis. Assassination and attacks on political figures in 'Ayn al-Hilwa and Saida became increasingly common. 10 Yousef, who alternately fought with Fateh, the PFLP, and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), noted that "the Lebanese Forces [in Saida] killed a lot of people, they used to kidnap people, would later throw him dead on the road. . . . It was a way to show they could do it."
11 Almost everyone whom I asked about Saida during this time could remember people they knew being assassinated; one former fighter summarized, "There was a lot of violence because of revenge."
12 Mahmud, a former guerrilla fighter from Sour, illustrated the pervasiveness of collaboration by asking, "Do you know about those manāyīk [fuckers] in the black hoods on the beach, the ones who told the Israelis who were fidā'īyīn [guerrillas]? Those guys were traitors, and they became the leadership in Ansar."
13 His question also elucidates why people became suspicious of released prisoners, wondering if they had supplied information to the Israelis that caused them to be freed when others were 8 In 1980, 227,554 United Nations-registered Palestinian refugees lived in Lebanon, of whom 120,342 were in refugee camps (Sa'id Ibrahim 1983). 9 As-Safir, October 3, 1982 10 See, for example, as-Safir, January 3, 1984, and May 11, 1984 . Conversation with Abu Hussain, author's field notes, June 2012. 11 Interview with Yousef (2), Beirut, Summer 2010. 12 Interview with Rima, Saida, Autumn 2010. For a theory of control and violence in civil war, see Kalyvas (1999 Kalyvas ( , 2006 . 13 See Fisk (2002, 246) for a description of this practice.
not. The Israelis' and the Christian militias' extensive recruitment of collaborators created an environment of deep suspicion and mistrust.
In Beirut, in contrast, the Lebanese government and Christian militias quickly deployed large-scale disarmament campaigns against the Palestinian population, detaining hundreds of Palestinian men throughout the autumn of 1982 (Picard 2002, 127; Y. Sayigh 1997, 555; Schiff and Ya'ari 1984, chap. 13) ; the risk of physical harm confined many Palestinian men to their homes and immediate neighborhoods.
14 The September 1982 massacre of thousands of civilians at the Sabra and Shatila camps in South Beirut following Presidentelect Bachir Gemayel's assassination only reinforced feelings of insecurity (Ang 1989; Fisk 2002, chap. 11; Picard 2002, 126; Y. Sayigh 1997, 539) . 15 After the massacre, Palestinians living in other Beirut neighborhoods feared that the violence would spread. Aisha, a Fateh cadre from Burj al-Barajna, recalled that people came to the camp saying that a massacre was happening, that Israel was killing people, and that the IDF would come into Burj al-Barajna next. 16 For Palestinian refugees remaining in Beirut, the events of autumn 1982 echoed the fall 1976 massacres at Tel al-Za'atar and Jisr alPasha refugee camps in East Beirut and convinced them that they had to find ways to protect the camps.
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A FAMILY AFFAIR: WOMEN AS ORGANIZATIONAL BROKERS
Given the fragmentation that Palestinian organizations experienced and the environments of deep insecurity in Beirut and South Lebanon, how did Palestinian rebel organizations rebuild? The emergence of clandestine logistics networks reflected a fundamental change in the ways that the PLO and guerrilla organizations operated. Before the 1982 invasion, quotidian social connections played a central role in mobilization (Peteet 1991, chap. 4; R. Sayigh 1979 R. Sayigh , chap. 4, 1998 ; when asked how they were recruited, Fateh members, in particular, tended to note family connections, whereas PFLP and DFLP members more often cited friendships. However, quotidian ties were not systematically used for critical "formal business"; recruits' assignment into different subdivisions depended on many factors, including interest, skill, perceived social appropriateness, and need. Although some women participated in combat units, they were largely placed in administrative offices, social services (e.g., kindergartens, literacy programs, health services), or support units such as information divisions (Kawar 1996, 70-73; Peteet 1991, chap. 5 Dalal told me that, at this juncture, "the role of women began" as the women and children left behind struggled to build shelters, tend to the wounded, and secure stable sources of food and water.
22
Women who had preexisting ties to a militant organization-"officially" through party membership, the zahrāt, a social service job with the PLO, or the GUPW, 23 or "unofficially" through a spouse, fiancé, or family member-mobilized within a specifically organizational context and through trust-based strong ties. Although there were shortages of food and building materials in the areas surrounding the camp, goods were still available in occupied Saida and institutions such as banks were open. Under these circumstances, women started volunteering to "visit" PLO-affiliated family members in the Beqa'a Valley and Trablous, areas in which the Palestinian resistance still had a presence. These initial trips served two purposes. First, as Dalal told me, "there was no communication, and people wanted news." Second, families were destitute and hungry; they needed income. Khadija 23 The GUPW is the PLO's mass organization for women. Its goals are to organize, mobilize, and represent Palestinian women while increasing their social status and supporting the Palestinian resistance (Rubenberg 1983, 73; TIEMC 1981, 79) . In 1982, 21,000 women in Lebanon were GUPW members (Rubenberg 1983, 73 ).
Abourahme, emphasizes the role that the humanitarian crisis in the camp played in her decision to smuggle communications and salaries: "My secret political work was a response to our reality. We woke up from a nightmare, and everything was different in 1982. I felt like any small deed, like delivering a salary to a family in need, was an accomplishment" (Abourahme 2010) . Dalal explained how quotidian ties influenced who went on trips to the Beqa'a Valley and Trablous: "If the woman had a son in the resistance, she would volunteer and go alone to get money."
24 When I asked if it was just mother-and-son dyads that engaged in these transfers, she elaborated: "maybe her father, maybe her husband, maybe from her neighbors."
25 Women would visit a trusted personal connection, pick up cash or organize a bank transfer, and return through the Shouf and occupied South Lebanon.
These trips assumed a third purpose as well. Munadileh, a PFLP cadre with brothers and an uncle in other leftist organizations, noted, "For women, there was a social role and a military role." 26 Military roles, by her definition, included gathering intelligence on the IDF, making food, sewing clothing, and smuggling all of the above to male guerrillas operating in the Shouf and around the southern camps. Women like Munidileh were particularly valuable in this context; as a nurse, she not only provided essential medical care but she was also already well known and trusted by the guerillas. This informal supply network allowed small bands of male guerrillas to operate more consistently near occupied areas, thereby strengthening resistance to the IDF. However, its loose structure made it vulnerable due to its lack of compartmentalization; for example, one of the high-level guerrillas operating around 'Ayn al-Hilwa was soon captured by the IDF. Following his interrogation, the IDF arrested 22 other guerrillas and sent them to an Israeli prison. 27 Dalal and Khadija emphasized that women were also well aware of the risks (Abourahme 2010). They could easily get caught in the ever shifting network of Israeli and Christian militia checkpoints, though their deaths were rarely confirmed or formally recognized by Palestinian organizations. As Dalal recalled, "they never came back. . .many of them are martyrs." 28 Organizational leadership in Lebanon and in exile worked to co-opt these grassroots operations to more systematized political and military ends. The initially uncomplicated bank transfer process consequently grew into the PLO's and guerrilla organizations' official conduit for underground fighters' salaries, which were routed through the Arab Bank in Saida. During this time, Yousef moved between combat theaters in the South and Beirut via the Shouf, which was controlled by the Druze Progressive Socialist Party (PSP). As an officer, he was responsible for distributing guerrilla fighters' salaries. The reorganized underground network contained three-to five-person cells; in general a leader could only manage two or three cells. 30 Yousef also noted that the funding that initially arrived in the Arab Bank was subsequently divided among the different guerrilla organizations, each of which had its own segmented courier network. Female couriers moved information between each level of the evolving hierarchy.
As the IDF, Lebanese militias, and the Syrian military built more checkpoints in response to increased guerrilla activity, Palestinian militants further diversified their clandestine operations. For example, underground cadres established a special information office that forged documentation. Dalal's male university professor recruited her into this division; the intersection of her military training in the zahrāt, her party membership, and her personal connection to a high-ranking officer made her appropriately skilled, trustworthy, and dependable. Identifying and avoiding collaborators were also necessarily high priorities; in addition to tracking the IDF, local women prioritized the unmasking of infiltrators. One former activist remembered an old woman from her locale who would "conveniently" drop papers or groceries whenever a collaborator walked past her in the street, revealing the agent to her contacts in the underground.
31 While this activist's age and gender acted as cover, the fact that she was personally connected to individuals involved in clandestine activity gave her the credibility to serve in a sensitive position, especially when false denunciation was a known problem. By the summer of 1983, underground activists informed by clandestine intelligence agents were clashing with members of the Palestinian National Guard, bombing shops that provided goods and services to the IDF, and assassinating collaborators. -Safir, June 15, 1983 , June 16, 1983 , March 10, 1984 , May 6, 1984 , May 8, 1984 , May 17, 1984 Clandestine activists also used family, friendship, and cross-national ties to develop strings of safe houses, which enabled them to move members of the Palestinian resistance deep into the cities. Houses owned by Lebanese members of Palestinian groups, homes belonging to imprisoned family and friends, and rooftops (which generally were not searched even if the house was) all became prime hiding spaces. 33 For example, Kamal, a Lebanese Fateh guerrilla, returned from exile via Trablous, moving to South Lebanon through the Beqa'a and the Shouf by leapfrogging between safe houses maintained by PLO sympathizers. His Christian heritage and kinship ties in South Lebanon afforded him added mobility and protection in areas patrolled by right-wing militias, making him a valuable asset to his majority Sunni Muslim organization.
Beirut
The security situation in Beirut differed from that in South Lebanon, originally producing a different logic of underground organization. Between September 1982 and February 1984, Palestinian men were under virtual house arrest; the Lebanese army had disarmed the population, and arrests, beatings, arson, and extrajudicial killings were everyday occurrences. After the massacre at Sabra and Shatila, Nader, a Fateh officer and former member of Fateh's special operations unit, Force 17, explained, "We wanted to start again, so we made very small, secret groups." They recruited subtly, in his word "indirectly"; when he or other activists ran into potential recruits on the street, they would chat with them for a while and look for signs that they wanted to be politically active. Nader or another trusted activist would then invite them to a small meeting to discuss the situation. Whenever they met, they would have coffee, music, and food-to make it seem "normal" in the event that an enemy was nearby.
34
Yet these small cells were geographically constrained by the men's lack of mobility and needed a communications system. Militants consequently recruited wives, sisters, cousins, fiancées, and occasionally trusted neighbors as couriers. Nader's mother explained that her niece became a courier and gunrunner between her son and his male cousins. 35 Asked why women in particular were recruited, Nader said that the fighters could trust women and that "they were with us." 36 Nader and his colleagues clearly saw an untapped resource, but also only exploited it through strong, reliable, and, if necessary, controllable relationships.
The small neighborhood-based cells, linked by female couriers, created the organizational infrastructure that allowed the PLO and Fateh to reinfiltrate Beirut. News of the system filtered back to the leadership, 20, 1984, and November 4, 1984 ; on targeting accused collaborators see, for example, As-Safir August 8, 1983 , September 28, 1984 , and January 5, 1985 Interview with Dalal, Saida, Spring 2011. 34 Interview with Nader, Beirut, Autumn 2010. 35 Conversation with Umm Nader, author's field notes, June 2012. 36 Interview with Nader, Beirut, Autumn 2010. which started transferring funds to Beirut through the Arab Bank. Jamila, the daughter of a Fateh officer who had trained with the Fateh zahrāt alongside several of her sisters, was one of the money smugglers. She would withdraw cash at the bank, enter the restroom, and strap the bills to her ankles or stomach to appear as though she were pregnant. Jamila would then deliver the money to male military officers. Abu Hassan, one of the accountants, explained that military officers would then distribute the cash to men such as him, who used it to pay bribes and salaries. 37 This compartmentalization provided a layer of security; a smuggler such as Jamila, who knew and was known by the leadership because of her father, did not interact with Abu Hassan, who knew where the money was going.
As a direct consequence of the bank transfer system, the "bridge to Cyprus"-a sea route that the PLO and Fateh used to reinfiltrate fighters from Tunis into Lebanon-was put into limited use in September 1983. 38 Landing a small vessel carrying a Palestinian fighter on the Beirut coast cost approximately US$50,000 per arrival, paid to the Lebanese Christian militias who controlled the port. Abu Hassan underscored the idea that "women-organized women in Fateh-transferred every letter" that underground cells in Beirut sent to each other to organize returning officers' movements.
39 Abu Omar, a PLO official who supervised these funding operations from exile in Tunis, commented that, during the period, "there was no difference between men and women in the PLO": Women were literally at the core of the Palestinian organizations' resurgence in Lebanon.
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The initial success of this "bridge" system led to its expansion and to cooperation with various Lebanese parties. In February 1984, Lebanese and Palestinian militias revolted in West Beirut, expelling right-wing militias and the army. According to Abu Hassan, the PLO established a sea route to Jounieh, a northern Lebanese port town, and a second direct link to Beirut through the airport. With the help of connections in the Lebanese PSP, DFLP, and the Lebanese Popular Nasserite Organization (PNO), "a number of veteran officers took advantage of the change of government to return illicitly. They set up 'safe houses', communications networks, and weapons stores in Beirut and Tripoli and revived dormant sections of the local organization." (Y. Sayigh 1997, 580-81) . For example, Abu Nidal, a high-level intelligence officer in the PLO, entered through Jounieh in 1984 and relied on his mothers' Lebanese friends and his personal contacts in Lebanese militias for hideouts. However, his case demonstrates why people often depended solely on kinship and marriage ties; Abu Nidal was denounced 37 Interview with Abu Hassan, Beirut, Summer 2012. 38 Heavy reinfiltration did not begin until February 1984, but interviewees insisted on the earlier date. Yezid Sayigh notes that, by the middle of 1984, "Fateh had organized a regular flow of personnel and funds to Lebanon, allowing it to establish a formal payroll, expand recruitment, and purchase weapons and supplies" (Y. Sayigh 1997, 581) . 39 Interview with Abu Hassan, Beirut, Summer 2012. 40 Interview with Abu Omar, Beirut, Autumn 2010.
by a Lebanese contact, imprisoned, and fled to the Gulf after his release. 41 But although Yezid Sayigh refers to the local divisions as "dormant," small cells such as those that Nader describes served a critical function at this juncture by alerting reinfiltrating officers to the considerable presence of both dissident Palestinian organizations and Syrian intelligence and by keeping members in close communication with each other.
This system also helped rebuild the PLO's social apparatus. After the 1982 evacuation, many of the PLO's social organizations-more than 105 affiliated institutions such as kindergartens, clinics, sports clubs, and vocational training centers in Beirut alone and 279 in total in Lebanon (TIEMC 1981)-had closed when employees and funding disappeared. Each closure would have represented a material and social blow to the organization's status and reach within the community. Several interviewees addressed this problem. Zahra, a Fateh guerrilla and member of the GUPW, worked with her contacts within the GUPW in the mid-1980s to construct and administer a kindergarten in the Shatila camp. Because she resided outside the camp and had ties to both male guerrilla officers and friends in the GUPW, Zahra was an ideal candidate to move money into Shatila through the sensitive zones of West Beirut.
Introducing further redundancies into the clandestine networks' infrastructure became critical after the Syrian-backed dissident faction Fateh al-Intifada ousted Fateh and the PLO from Trablous and the Beqa'a between 1983 and 1984. Losing the Trablous foothold to the dissidents not only ushered in a period of violent contention between PLO-affiliated guerrilla groups and the Syria-allied Palestinian opposition but also made it impossible for PLO affiliates to use the Beqa'a and North Lebanon as bases for operations into South Lebanon and Beirut. When the IDF closed Ansar prison and subsequently withdrew from Saida and Sour to a "security zone" on the Lebanese-Israeli border in early 1985, the PLO and Fateh shifted their infiltration activities to Saida's coastline. This move not only helped infiltrate more officers into Lebanon but also hedged against Syrian-allied Palestinian and Lebanese militias' growing power in Beirut, North Lebanon, and the Beqa'a.
Backbone of the Rebellion
Underlying quotidian social networks provided a resilient relational infrastructure on which Palestinian militant organizations rebuilt between 1982 and 1985. Even in the face of acute fragmentation, militant organizations reemerged during this time. They established information, financial, and supply channels; reinitiated armed activity; and addressed the challenge of collaboration. They were able to achieve these aims because militant structures were deeply embedded in communities via social network redundancies. Existing analyses of militant organizations (Humphreys and Weinstein 2006; Johnston 2008; Sinno 2010; Staniland 41 Conversations with Abu Nidal, author's field notes, July 2010. 2012; Weinstein 2007) overlook this critical element of militant organizations' capacities, neglecting to examine the social network processes that rebels use to cope with crisis. It is not the simple presence of ties between militant organizations and communities that matters for outcomes such as sustained rebellion and organizational survival. Rather, the configuration of network overlap between militant hierarchies and quotidian social structures and the existence of trust-based brokers between militant subdivisions produce resilient rebel organizations.
THE WAR OF THE CAMPS: ROUTINIZING CLANDESTINE ACTIVITY AND INVOKING INTERORGANIZATIONAL TIES
Fateh and the PLO's expanding presence in Lebanon threatened a volatile combination of Lebanese militias, the Syrian military, and Palestinian militias that were part of the Syrian-allied, anti-Arafat (and thus anti-PLO and anti-Fateh) opposition Palestinian National Salvation Front (PNSF). 42 The Syrian government saw Fateh's resurgence as an attempt to pull Lebanon back into war, whereas its ally, the Lebanese Shi'a militia Amal, worried about renewed Palestinian-Israeli hostilities in South Lebanon again taking their toll on civilians (Y. Sayigh 1997, 582) . With Syrian support, Amal attacked Sabra and Shatila on May 19, 1985, starting the three-year War of the Camps. Throughout the following years, Shatila, Burj al-Barajna, and, later, Rashidiyya sustained heavy mortar and rocket shelling and infantry attacks, and they withstood sieges lasting up to six months (Giannou 1990, 248-49) . During sieges, Amal, bolstered by the Lebanese Armed Forces' predominantly Shi'a Sixth Brigade, prohibited the entry of food and medical supplies, forcing thousands to the brink of starvation (Ang 1989; Giannou 1990 ). Even when Amal periodically lifted the siege, the militia and its allies prohibited Palestinians from bringing fuel, batteries, building materials, or weaponry into the camps. Starting in 1986, battles between Palestinian guerrillas and Amal took place in the hills surrounding Magdousha above 'Ayn al-Hilwa, a camp on the outskirts of Saida.
Clandestine networks in Beirut, Saida, and Sour evolved to encompass a broader, more sophisticated set of tasks during the War of the Camps. In response to Amal's attacks on the Beirut camps, the PLO and Fateh headquartered their infiltration and financial operations in Saida. This move created two tiers of smugglers within the clandestine apparatus: women who worked between Saida and either Sour or Beirut (and thus had to cross from relatively safe areas into combat zones) and women who worked locally within Beirut and, later, Sour (who had to cross from besieged camps into territory controlled by Amal). Within these zones, militants' roles frequently changed. For example, Zahra, the Fateh guerrilla who worked in a Shatila kindergarten, smuggled Fateh salaries into the camp during the War of the Camps. However, her affiliation was public knowledge; in 1986 she was denounced by members of a PNSF organization and imprisoned by Syrian intelligence. On her release, Syrian-allied groups set up a checkpoint under her apartment in West Beirut, forcing her to sleep outside her family home and to curtail her activities substantially. Rather than return to clandestine work, Zahra then began working in a humanitarian aid division of the GUPW, providing food and clothing to civilians.
From the beginning of the War of the Camps in May 1985, violence against the Beirut camps assumed an explicitly collective character. As such, it recalled recent campaigns against Palestinians in Beirut and reactivated the community ties that undergirded emergent militias in the region. The decentralized local militias that female couriers linked from 1982-85 evolved into shared military fronts in Shatila and Burj al-Barajna; Chris Giannou notes that, in Shatila, "Each political organization had an allotted area of the battle-front periphery as its military responsibility" (Giannou 1990, 33) . 43 Because of the restrictions on men's movement, women became responsible for transferring all supplies into the two camps. Aisha noted the difference between women's and men's roles in the defense of the camps during this period, emphasizing that, because of the stationary fronts, smuggling and logistics roles became combat positions: "Women died going to get food and water. . .women came face to face with Amal and the Syrians. They were searched, threatened, beaten. . .they were raped and killed while the men hid and shot at [Amal] ."
44 Rawan, also a former member of the logistics network, noted that she had to move under fire through the camp to deliver food, ammunition, and sandbags to the fronts while male fighters hunkered in fortified positions. 45 Similar practices evolved in Sour during the siege of 1986. In spite of the PLO-PNSF rivalry, Tala pointed out that women in her politically divided family still smuggled money and food from Saida to Sour, using kinship networks in multiple militant organizations as cover for their travel and political contacts. When Amal besieged Rashidiyya in 1986, people in Burj al-Shemali organized secret nautical supply routes into the camp using fishing dinghies and small military boats. 46 Tala, her husband, and her brothers-in-law described how increasing attacks on Rashidiyya and al-Buss, and thus the need for relief missions, inspired the creation of " [military] operations rooms" in the southern camps and the construction of underground emergency rooms to treat those injured during smuggling assignments.
prints within the camps that were not under siege, representing some routinization and institutionalization of their activities.
The GUPW played an increasingly central role in coordinating clandestine logistics and support activities (Giannou 1990, 42-49; Khalili 2007, chap. 7) : It was the hub through which female money smugglers connected to families in the camps and, in some cases, to the male military leadership. Yousef noted that by 1985 or 1986 "there was a woman's office that managed all women's activities," including both smuggling and other support work. By the Battle of Magdousha in 1986, the Women's Union in 'Ayn al-Hilwa was also helping coordinate support and medical services for fighters. Munadileh noted that serving in these functions "brought women together. There were people from all of the organizations together. It [the GUPW] shared the revolutionary work with the men." 48 As the Lebanese and Syrians became aware of this system, the PLO also began using other organizations such as the General Union of Palestinian Students and various humanitarian associations-frequently staffed by former female smugglers-to funnel money into Lebanon.
49
Bridging Rival Organizations: Mixed-Descent Militants and Schoolyard Friends
Due to the political dynamic introduced by the creation of the opposition PNSF and by Amal's attacks on the camps, quotidian relationships between members of PLO-allied militant organizations, PNSF factions, and Lebanese Shi'a militias 50 became particularly significant during the camp sieges in Beirut and Sour. Fatehand DFLP-affiliated women with quotidian ties to the PNSF or to Lebanese Shi'a became especially valuable to the clandestine apparatus. Aisha and her cousin, Ibtisam, also a Fateh cadre, explained that when Amal periodically lifted the blockade, they would pick up weapons from male officers and strap them to their inner thighs for the trip back into the camp.
51 Their uncle, a Lebanese Shi'a, was an officer in Amal to whom they could appeal if they were caught.
52 Abu Hussain-a Fateh cadre, former underground guerrilla, and former Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) officer with brothers in two leftist organizations-selected his wife to smuggle arms through a network of tunnels and sewers under the camps; if she were to be caught, his contacts in PNSF could protect her.
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Militants' quotidian ties also served as political cover for low-level negotiations and prisoner releases. Giannou emphasizes that Shatila's militants depended on these relationships: As a rule, PNSF leaders did not meet with Fateh Arafat top leaders, but second-echelon officers, often childhood classmates and friends, did. Some served as intermediaries between the factions as during the Four-Day Battle, to set up the work teams and co-ordinate the many services-water, electricity, distribution of building materials, or food, building of fortifications-necessary to organize life in the camp and resistance to Amal. (Giannou 1990, 43) Quotidian ties also protected individuals who were unaffiliated with militant factions. Abu Zaki, a humanitarian worker from Rashidiyya, explained that, when Amal kidnapped him, he had no organizational apparatus to intervene on his behalf. He was released when the Palestinian Shi'a parents of a child he had helped intervened by invoking kinship ties with Amal's head of security in the region, a Shi'a Palestinian. 54 The way in which the large family's members belonged to both Palestinian and Lebanese political organizations provided leverage for an under-the-table concession.
Power Couples: Engineering Brokerage through Marriage
Events that fundamentally altered the structure of activists' quotidian social networks-especially marriage-opened new mobilization trajectories within the evolving clandestine apparatus that could accelerate a clandestine activist's career. Nawal's experience is particularly instructive regarding the progressive feedback between a woman's political activity and her quotidian relationships. Now a regional-level official in GUPW and a Fateh cadre, Nawal was encouraged by her family to join the zahrāt in the late 1970s to "become strong." Her father was a national-level Fateh officer; her brother had joined the ashbāl as a child and became a cadre during the war. At the beginning of the War of the Camps, the teenager Nawal and three of her friends from the zahrāt started sneaking supplies such as food and cigarettes into Shatila, telling the Amal militiamen that they were simply visiting children. Nawal and her friends had no contact with or direction from higher authorities at this time. 55 Yassin, a regional officer in Fateh and former underground guerrilla in Beirut, explained that after he noticed the girls' humanitarian operation, he took a liking to Nawal and eventually asked her to marry him.
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Yassin then introduced Nawal to regional officers in Saida, leading to Nawal's advancement within Fateh and the GUPW. As she recalled, During the second siege, I got married; I was 16 years old. My husband wanted someone smart, someone who knows politics. He took me to his colleagues in the organization, and I began working in the Women's Union. I learned how it worked, I met the officer for the area. I shared in 54 Yassin subsequently arranged for Nawal's military, ideological, and emergency first aid training through Fateh. As a trusted cadre, Nawal began traveling as an emissary between Fateh's Saida and Beirut offices, bridging regional and functional divisions using kinship (through her brother), marriage (through Yassin), and friendship (through old friends in Beirut) ties. The interaction between her quotidian relationships and organizational role resulted in Nawal's increasing centrality in both Fateh and the GUPW. Fateh promoted her as a military cadre in 1986, when she fought in the battle of Magdousha against Amal in the hills above 'Ayn al-Hilwa.
58 Nawal described her role in that battle: Nawal's combat experience demonstrates how marriage ties filtered women into roles, creating new modes of militant organization such as the coed guerrilla front at Magdousha. Many women gained access to new divisions of militant organizations due to the institutional bridges that their quotidian network relationships created. However, husbands also advanced as a direct result of wives' activism; Yassin was more likely to be selected for central roles because of Nawal's reputation, skill set, and influence in the GUPW. Other women also described how their marriages served both organizational ends and advanced partners' careers. Munadileh and her husband, who married in the mid-1980s, were also selected as an elite spousal team to fight at Magdousha; her previous experience in combat during the 1982 invasion made him an especially attractive candidate for frontline roles.
Routinized Operations, Informal Connections?
Militants refined and routinized clandestine operations during the War of the Camps. In addition to simply moving information, finances, and supplies, clandestine networks allowed organizational politics to assume an increasingly informal character as militants used quotidian ties to bypass formal alliances. Militant organizations increasingly sought to actively engineer quotidian brokers into their structures to create redundancies. 57 Interview with Nawal, South Lebanon, Autumn 2010. 58 This military campaign was expressly designed to pressure Amal to lift the sieges in Beirut and the Sour camps. 59 Interview with Nawal, South Lebanon, Autumn 2010.
In particular, marriages formed new bases for militant organization and provided marked career advantages for both female and male Palestinian rebels. Although Goodwin (1997) concluded that these types of ties damage rebel organizations, it is clear that quotidian relationships contributed directly to Palestinian militants' military and political capacities during the War of the Camps.
CONCLUSION
The case of Palestinian organizations in Lebanon should be used to inform broader scholarship on militant organization, internal conflict, and high-risk mobilization. It reveals that, although back-end military practices such as resupply, logistics, and finance are understudied, these roles are central to sustaining rebellion. In other words, these divisions are critical locations of political practice and development in their own right. More broadly, this case demonstrates that militant organizations do not behave as closed systems, but are inextricably interwoven with quotidian social relationships. The magnitude of these networks' interactions and the pace of social change that they produce, however, are deeply context specific.
In contrast to threshold-based models of mobilization (Granovetter 1978; Marwell, Oliver, and Prahl 1988; McAdam 1986; Petersen 2001; Siegel 2009; Tarrow 1994, 33) , this article illustrates how individuals' positions in social networks affect not only their likelihood of participation but also the organizational roles that they subsequently assume. Overlap between formal militant hierarchies and quotidian social networks interact with conflict environments over time, creating new positions to fill, new risk calculations, and new mobilization trajectories over time. Using catch-all terms such as "participation" or "fighting" to describe all organized rebel activity thus obscures the ways in which new modes of involvement constantly emerge from dynamic network interactions. Future research into internal conflict should examine how rapid rebel redeployment and reorganization throughout armed conflict affect conflict dynamics and duration, in particular because internal rebel structures have been linked to military effectiveness and patterns of violence (Staniland 2012 , Johnston 2008 , Pearlman 2011 , Weinstein 2007 .
Dynamic social network interactions represent one source of organizational resilience in the face of fragmentation. Clearly, these processes are more likely to occur in some cases than others; determining how different degrees and configurations of organizationalquotidian overlap produce durable organizational apparatuses is an important line of future inquiry. This question is particularly salient because many militant organizations actively seek to break down, rather than to exploit militants' quotidian social network ties. Goodwin (1997) , for example, points out that the Huk leadership saw affectual ties as impediments to military discipline and solidarity. Are these organizations systematically less resilient as a result? In a different vein, it seems improbable that organizations with high proportions of foreign fighters-such as Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria-lean heavily on local quotidian ties for logistical support in crises. Do these types of organizations seek to develop these relationships over time by, for example, marrying into local populations? Or do they exploit geographically extended relations to insulate supply and financial chains from the risks of the battlefield? Answering these questions would provide crucial insight into a growing number of armed conflicts that feature organizationally complex and strategically sophisticated militant organizations, shedding light on their likely social impact and sources of political influence.
